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1. Introduction
In 2014, American legal scholar Ryan Calo warned against the perils of “dig-
ital market manipulation”, defined as “the specific set of emerging technologies 
and techniques that will empower corporations to discover and exploit the limits 
of each consumer’s ability to pursue his or her own self-interest” (Calo, 2014). 
Five years later, Calo’s prophecy is seemingly coming true. Reports and studies 
in different fields of research show how big tech companies can employ differ-
ent Machine Learning techniques to predict psychological traits and emotional 
states of their users and use this knowledge to shape the virtual and legal en-
vironment where they make purchase decisions (Burr et al., 2018; Burr and 
Cristianini, 2019). Such developments represent a threat to the autonomy and 
freedom of individuals (Mik, 2016) and constitute one of the challenges for EU 
consumer law in the algorithmic era (Jabłonowska et al., 2018).
Against this background, this paper conceptualises two ways in which AI 
fundamentally increases the risk of manipulation for consumers and considers 
how these developments question established EU fair marketing law.
The work is divided into two parts. The first part clarifies the concept of ‘AI’ 
and ‘consumer manipulation’ and describes two ways in which AI is reshaping 
our traditional comprehension of manipulative marketing. One relates to the new 
pool of personal, fine-grained, marketing-sensitive information that businesses 
can extract from consumers’ data thanks to ever more refined predictive tech-
niques. The other relies on the power of AI systems to instantly and continuous-
ly learn from consumers’ feedback in order to optimise marketing tasks. The 
second part questions the role of current EU fair marketing law in protecting 
consumers against ‘AI-powered’ manipulative commercial practices. Here, an 
account will be given of the virtues and the vices of the Unfair Commercial Prac-
tice Directive, the prime European legal tool dealing with distortive and manip-
ulative commercial practices. Subsequently, the recent US legislative proposal 
of the Deceptive Experience To Online Users Reduction Act will be reviewed, 
as it may represent an example of how fair marketing law can regulate the new 
sophisticated tools of technological influence. Conclusive takeaways will follow.
2. “Artificial Intelligence” and “consumer manipulation”
There can be several ways to start a discourse on Artificial Intelligence and 
consumer manipulation. The topic is extensive and confining it to an article is 
not an easy task. Besides, the two concepts alone are already ambiguous and 
vague by themselves and do not certainly facilitate defining tasks. However, 
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since this paper tackles the problem with a regulatory focus in mind, the best 
way to proceed is to have at least a clear understanding of the subject of discus-
sion – without any ambition of completeness.
As always, one would be tempted to give a general definition of AI. As in-
triguing as it sounds, the author believes this exercise is fundamentally wrong. 
Broad definitions can lead to generalisation and loss of nuance. Moreover, one-
size-fits-all definition of AI is probably not needed, at least for purposes of legal 
research and regulation: AI is not the same thing when it comes to self-driving 
cars or autonomous weapons or personalised advertising. Instead, it is far more 
critical to have a clear understanding of what we mean when we refer to AI, in 
our specific problem-driven context. This work follows the idea that AI should 
not be merely seen as a technology but as a complex socio-technical phenom-
enon (Balkin, 2015, p. 48). Rather than focusing on AI as such, one should 
consider how people interact with AI and how people interact with other people 
using AI. Hence, in this paper, we will focus on how companies employing AI 
interact with consumers, thereby increasing the risk of manipulative outcomes. 
In such a context, ‘AI’ is understood simply as algorithms that learn from expe-
rience to optimise specific tasks that are specifically related to the management 
of marketing and consumers relationships.
As a further point, it is well known that the issue of digital manipulation has 
a wide echo. The infamous scandal of Cambridge Analytica has put digital in-
termediaries into the public spotlight – for the first time in such a resounding 
way – revealing their ability to shake the very democratic foundations of our 
societies by subtly and hiddenly influencing our beliefs and political opinions. 
Researchers, including legal scholars, are increasingly paying attention to this 
phenomenon inspired by protecting and enhancing citizens’ cognitive freedom 
vis-à-vis the new gatekeepers of information (Tucker et al., 2018; Harambam 
et al., 2018). Nevertheless, in this paper, we look at the effect of AI only with 
regard to the ‘commercial side’ of manipulation, that is, the somehow unfair 
distortion of purely economic behaviours of consumers. For this reason, we will 
just show how AI can affect the deliberative process of digital consumers in 
connection with contract-related decisions, which have an intrinsic economic 
value (e.g., clicking on online ads, consenting to the processing of personal data, 
purchasing a product or subscribing to a service, deactivating an user account, 
etc.). This choice is deliberate. As we will see in the next sections, EU fair mar-
keting law, which is the benchmark of the analysis, has always had a particular 
interest in protecting consumers’ economic interests against undue forms of 
commercial manipulation.
When does a commercial practice manipulate consumers? In marketing, 
there is always a thin line between persuasion, typically designated as the 
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original mission of advertising, and manipulation, which is intuitively perceived 
as unfair. Consequently, it is not clear when the distortion of consumers’ eco-
nomic behaviour – undoubtedly present also in non-manipulative persuasion – 
becomes a problem for the law. This issue has always received scarce attention 
from lawyers because of the elusive meaning of ‘manipulation’ and its difficult 
digestion in a legal order that defends economic freedom. Today, however, ma-
nipulation discourse is back in the forefront. In many fields of social sciences, 
private and public research has progressively proved the easy-to-manipulate 
nature of human beings and these findings are today within reach of companies 
and governments.
According to one of the most prominent jurists who has recently dedicated 
much attention to the definition of manipulation, “a statement or action is ma-
nipulative to the extent that it does not sufficiently engage or appeal to people’s 
capacity for reflective and deliberative choice” (Sunstein, 2016). In fact, it is now 
widely believed that human beings are guided by two ‘cognitive systems’ when 
making decisions. System 1 is fast, automatic, intuitive; System 2 is slower, 
reflective and deliberative (Kahneman, 2011). System 1 does not necessarily 
work badly. We often use intuition and heuristics with good results (for exam-
ple, we can positively use educated guess when looking for the toilette during 
the night or when driving under uncertain circumstances), while reflection and 
deliberation can lead to mistakes (using deliberation in case of multiplication of 
high figures may often lead to errors). Nevertheless, the problem with System 
1 is that it is prone to several types of common biases, e.g., optimism bias (the 
tendency to be too optimistic), present bias (the tendency to give more weight 
to payoffs that are closer in time), anchoring (the tendency to rely heavily on 
a specific trait or piece of information when making decisions), framing effect 
(drawing different conclusions from the same information depending on how 
that information is presented). These biases can be easily anticipated, and the 
use of proper choice architecture (so-called ‘nudge’) can profoundly influence 
the course of individuals’ decision-making (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009). Follow-
ing Sunstein’s definition of manipulation, manipulators target System 1 (exploit-
ing bias) and prevent the recipient of manipulation from engaging with System 2. 
For example, graphic warnings on packets of cigarettes aim to exploit people’s 
attentional bias, i.e., the tendency of perception to be influenced by recurring 
thoughts (the more you look to graphic warnings, the more you think about 
quitting smoking); an insurance company that presents its advertising by de-
scribing a horrible situation in which insurance would be very useful leverages 
our framing effect bias, etc.
Sunstein notes, however, that not all cases of manipulation are ethically repre-
hensible; this will depend on the perspective adopted. If we take a deontological 
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stance, manipulation always fails to respect people’s dignity and autonomy. 
From a welfarist point of view, to which only those who choose know what is 
best for them, manipulation is not necessarily evil. Some people may benefit 
from being manipulated (e.g., a smoker who desperately wants to quit). How-
ever, even for welfare reasons, manipulation becomes ethically reprehensible 
and may justify an appropriate normative response when (a) the manipulator’s 
motives become more self-interested or venal and (b) their efforts to circumvent 
people’s deliberative capacities become more successful. Such a delineation of 
ethically (and possibly legally) reprehensible manipulation is not black-and-white, 
but incremental and nuanced (Sunstein speaks of ‘fifty shades of manipulation’): 
the more the manipulator’s motive is self-serving and lucrative, and the more 
significant the effectiveness of the manipulative attempt, the more reprehensible 
the manipulation will be, and legal intervention will be justified.
Thus understood, we can see the relationship between the concepts of ‘AI’ 
and ‘consumer manipulation’, namely how AI increases the risks of manipula-
tion, thereby justifying a legal intervention.
Following Sustein’s definition, first of all, the manipulator’s interest must be 
lucrative and self-serving. We can hardly think of private companies that use 
AI for the sole benefit of consumers. They are companies, and they are driven 
by profit. Their motive is lucrative and self-serving by definition. Nevertheless, 
this does not necessarily imply that the motive is also hateful and obnoxious. 
There may be situations where the interests of the company and the consum-
er converge. Think, for example, of the company’s algorithm that targets the 
consumer with a personalised ad that reflects his or her true preferences, by 
appealing to their attentional bias (e.g., by using a particular colour, font, by 
leveraging a certain claim or nudge). In that case, the system might manipulate 
the consumer, but it would do so for the consumer’s own well-being. (However, 
this would be hardly sustainable from a welfarist point of view, because only the 
consumer knows what is best for him or her, but it certainly makes manipulation 
less reprehensible.) However, the opposite case can also be envisaged, where 
the interests of the company and those of the consumer diverge. Imagine the 
case where the company’s algorithm has to choose between a free video and 
a paid video while calculating the expected revenue that could come from dif-
ferent advertisements associated with different videos. In such a scenario, if the 
system shows the paid video to the consumer, the companies act in their own 
interest and against the consumer’s interest. There may be different scenarios in 
which the company’s interest and the consumer’s interest concur or compete, 
which would give different degrees of meaning to the ‘lucrative and self-interest 
motive’ requirement. However, one can generalise by saying that a company has 
a lucrative and self-interested motive when AI systems can choose between the 
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interests of the company and those of the consumer and go for the former and 
not the latter.
At this point, the reader can understand how AI increases the effectiveness 
of companies’ attempts to circumvent consumers’ deliberative capabilities.
3. Predictive powers
A prediction is an estimate of the probability that something will happen in 
the future based on experience. Prediction is at the core of managing customers 
relationships; companies continuously have to predict events or values such as 
return on investments in marketing, risk assessment, customers’ preferences, 
customer budget constraint, customer retention, customer conversion, etc. To-
day, many of these tasks can be optimised through predictive analytics.
Predictive analytics is a field at the intersection of data mining, statistical 
modelling and machine learning that aims to build models that make predictions 
based on patterns extracted from historical data (Kelleher et al., 2015). While 
traditional business analytics has been able to build predictive models that con-
sider only a static and finite amount of data, the employment of machine learning 
algorithms for data and predictive analytics allows to respond to new data and 
improve the granularity and accuracy of prediction over time. The peculiarity of 
learning algorithms is that they are able to infer rules of future behaviour directly 
from data without being explicitly programmed. There can be different machine 
learning models to perform this prediction (e.g., decision tree, regression, classi-
fication, etc.), either characterised by the need of a phase of previous training by 
a human (so-called supervised learning) or not (so-called unsupervised learning). 
The choice of the technique will depend on the task to be performed – for pre-
dictive analytics, the most frequently used are decision tree, logistic and linear 
regression and neural networks.
A rather well-established practice in business intelligence is to use predictive 
analytics to estimate customers’ preferences in order to anticipate their desires 
and needs: for example, sequential purchase of customers (Goel et al., 2010), 
improving targeted advertising (Richardson et al., 2007), understanding brand 
perception (Culotta and Cutler, 2016). In recent years, however, studies have 
shown how machine learning techniques can also be employed to predict more 
‘sensitive’ aspects of consumers’ behaviour. For example, researchers have 
demonstrated the ability to use social media profiles (Quercia et al., 2011; Kos-
inski et al., 2013), blogs (Yarkoni, 2010) or language use (Schwartz et al., 2016) 
to accurately infer users’ psychological traits, such as the ‘Big 5’, customer’s 
values, degree of deliberation, intelligence and risk aversion, etc. Other studies 
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have proved that it is possible to predict users’ psychological transient states, 
such as mood and emotions, attention and stress, by analysing real-time spo-
ken and written language (D’mello and Kory, 2015; Hu and Flaxman, 2018) and 
video (Teixeira et al., 2012). There is a whole emerging field of research and 
business applications called ‘affective computing’ whose purpose is to create 
software that recognises and processes human emotions (Cambria, 2016).
Although expressed in the form of forecasts and not facts, this new wealth 
of knowledge is of extreme value to businesses. Predictions can be used as 
input for different kinds of decision-making tasks: from determining what piece 
of advertising to display to single consumers (Roffo and Vinciarelli, 2016; Matz 
et al., 2017) to optimising entertainment or content relevance through the use 
of recommendation systems (Ning et al., 2019); from personalising commercial 
offers and the content of contracts (Hacker, 2017) to customising website and 
apps graphics, so-called ‘morphing’ (Hauser et al., 2009). Companies are able 
to take advantage of this sensitive information to customise any aspect of the 
commercial interaction with consumers, both ‘virtual’ (such as the ‘look and 
feel’ of the web page, the layout, the page rank) and ‘real’ (advertising specific 
products, offering tailor-made services, setting customised prices, personalising 
contract terms of service).
It is not only a common intuition but also a scientific fact that there is a 
strong relationship between successful marketing and the ability of businesses 
to leverage the personality and emotions of consumers (Odekerken-Schröder 
et al., 2003; Hirsh et al., 2012; Bagozzi et al., 1999). However, effective mar-
keting strategies do not imply that consumers are being manipulated. In fact, 
some experiments show how personalising the website according to con-
sumers’ personality traits increases their happiness and engagement (Matz 
et al., 2016). While this is true, it is also true that there may be cases where 
certain psychological traits expose consumers to increased vulnerability to 
marketing activities (e.g., agreeableness, neuroticism, risk aversion, subjective 
well -being, etc.). Moreover, when it comes to temporary moods or emotional 
states, advocates of a deontological account of manipulation would argue 
that consumers must be treated with dignity and that exploiting their non-ra-
tional being for commercial purposes is inherently unfair. This thesis is deeply 
rooted in our conception of modern legality, in which individuals are autono-
mous and rational beings and must be treated in this way. Even if we were to 
take a welfarist stance, we would end up saying that exploiting psychological 
weaknesses or emotions without revealing it (as it would generally happen if 
exploitation takes place through an algorithm) diminishes the ability of con-
sumers to deliberate autonomously and freely on what is best for them, thus 
increasing the likelihood of manipulation.
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Increased AI-driven predictive powers enable businesses to gain a pre-
cious, marketing-sensitive knowledge on consumers that has an inherent po-
tential to bypass consumers’ deliberative system, thereby magnifying the risks 
of manipulation.
4. Loops of feedback and learning
So far, we have seen how AI quantitatively increases the risk of consumer 
manipulation, i.e., how it broadens and deepens the pool of information from 
which companies can draw from to persuade consumers to make certain choic-
es. Now, we will explain how AI also qualitatively, by its nature, strengthens the 
possibility for businesses to distort consumers’ behaviour. For this purpose, we 
must think of the relationship between a company and a consumer as a dynamic 
learning process mediated by an algorithm (Burr et al., 2018).
Let us imagine the situation where a company wants a consumer to buy its 
products and therefore needs to establish what kind of advertising the consum-
er is more likely to click on. The company’s algorithm will choose from a set of 
available actions (i.e., a different set of ads) by leveraging what it knows about 
the consumer. A statistical model is created that correlates each possible action 
with the consumer’s click probability. The model can be multifactorial and take 
into account the price (how much the consumer is likely to spend), the context, 
the layout, the colour and the font of the ad, and possibly even the timing of the 
advertising. The algorithm can also be designed to consider different strategies 
to present the choice to the consumer using most popular nudges (e.g., de-
faults, framing, simplification, rankings, etc.).
Once the algorithm chooses one of the possible actions, the consumer re-
acts by clicking or not. This feedback enables the algorithm to determine and 
learn from the consequences of its action and serves to update the function to 
achieve its goal. The process is repeated iteratively, in a trial-and-error exercise 
(i.e., each time the consumer is targeted with a different piece of advertising) until 
the consumer clicks and the algorithm learns the setting that led to the desired 
result.
This process, called ‘feedback loops’ in behavioural theory, is basically what 
lies at the basis of many ML tools of large companies applying ‘reinforcement 
learning’ (RL) techniques. A system based on RL decides according to experi-
ence the sequence of actions to perform in an uncertain and complex environ-
ment in order to achieve some goals (François-Lavet et al., 2018). The company 
must set the goal and, using rewards and punishments as proxies of a desired 
or an undesirable action, indicates how the algorithm will learn to achieve it. This 
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suggests that the company does not necessarily require a complete a priori 
knowledge about consumers in order to choose the best marketing strategy, but 
it can also learn ex-post, from individual interactions with consumers.
Given also the increasing use of RL-based marketing applications, AI is go-
ing to influence the way of doing business profoundly.1 By relying on pattern 
recognition and prediction, digital companies will take advantage of the new 
machine-based way of experimenting with consumers. Unlike data analysis, 
which only expresses probability, experiments allow businesses to understand 
the causal relationships between company marketing decisions and consumers’ 
behaviour, which can then be modelled to achieve the desired result (Varian, 
2010, 2018). This logic (‘set the goal and let the machine do the rest’) has the 
potential to alter our understanding of consumer manipulation dramatically. De-
spite everything, we are accustomed to think about manipulation tactics just as 
an attempt to circumvent people deliberative capacities.
The more refined the tactic, the more plausible its success, but there will 
always be a degree of uncertainty. Many people are sensible and cunning to 
commercial manipulation, and those that are not can be trained to become more 
careful and suspicious. To a certain extent, educating people is what can also be 
done in cases of vigorous attempts at manipulation through AI, where companies 
can exploit the knowledge of our deepest selves. However, with AI applications 
mediating business-consumers and learning instantly and continuously from ex-
perience, manipulation becomes an act of behavioural engineering where com-
panies only need to master the art of reinforcements and punishments that can 
reliably produce the specific behaviour that the company selects. This implies 
that manipulation becomes a structural feature of a commercial practice (such 
as marketing) mediated by AI that no longer alters consumer behaviour but cre-
ates, shapes, and precisely engineers wanted behaviours through skilful coding. 
Shoshana Zuboff calls this ‘the reality business’, a commercial logic centred on 
the “knowledge about real-time behaviour that creates opportunities to intervene 
in and modify behaviour for-profit” (Zuboff, 2015).
Predictive powers and loops of feedback and learning are two sides of the 
same phenomenon: the ability of businesses to increasingly automate tasks for 
the management of customer relations – both in the observing-predicting phase 
and in the decisional phase – through a continuous process of learning.
1 George Karapalidis, Three examples of how reinforcement learning could revolutionise digital 
marketing, accessible at <https://econsultancy.com/reinforcement-learning-revolutionise-digital-mar-
keting-case-studies/>; Sourish Dey, Leveraging Power of Reinforcement learning in Digital Marketing, 
accessible at <https://towardsdatascience.com/leveraging-power-of-reinforcement-learning-in-digital-mar-
keting-d373c88a39ab>.
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This paradigmatic shift is changing the very essence of marketing. The latter 
is defined by American Marketing Association as “the activity, set of institutions, 
and processes for creating, communicating, delivering, and exchanging offer-
ings that have value for customers, clients, partners, and society at large”. In the 
era of AI, marketing is increasingly becoming the activity of preventive design 
of future customer interactions through the use of AI processes.2 As a result, 
manipulation becomes the ability of companies to design AI-driven processes to 
guide customers towards a predetermined outcome mechanically.
5. The role of EU fair marketing law?
The capacity of intelligent systems to increase manipulative outcomes (not 
only) for consumers is accounted as one of the ethical/legal challenges to estab-
lish good governance of AI (Ebers, 2019; Mazzini, 2019). To this latter end, many 
countries and international organisations have recently developed strategies or 
guidelines on the development, the deployment and the use of AI systems and 
their impact on society.
In April 2018, the European Commission presented the Communication on 
‘Artificial Intelligence for Europe’, the first comprehensive policy position spe-
cifically focused on Artificial Intelligence.3 One of the building blocks of the Eu-
ropean strategy is to ensure an appropriate ethical and legal framework for the 
development and use of AI. Among others, a key aspect is to avoid that AI 
harms citizens and consumers and ensure that “large-scale use of AI-enabled 
tools in business-to-consumer transactions ... (are) fair, transparent and compli-
ant with consumer legislation”.
The Communication also established a group of experts to work on ethical 
guidelines for AI. Last December, the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intel-
ligence published the ‘Ethical Guidelines for a Trustworthy AI’.4 According to the 
latter, AI systems should be developed by treating individuals “as moral subjects, 
rather than merely as objects to be sifted, sorted, scored, herded, conditioned 
or manipulated”. Additionally, government and non-governmental organisations 
must also mitigate the capability of AI systems to generate “(in)direct illegitimate 
2 Floridi (2019) argues that “marketing sees and uses people as interfaces. Its goal is to identify the 
most efficient and effective ways to use the human interfaces so as to obtain what the interfaces give ac-
cess to which, in politics, is represented, in logical order, by attention, consent, and vote”. In our context, 
we could easily replace ‘politics’ with ‘commercial relationships’ and ‘vote’ with ‘money’.
3 European Commission, Communication ‘Artificial Intelligence for Europe’, COM (2018) 237 final.
4 The European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Trustworthy AI, Draft ‘Ethics Guidelines for 
Trustworthy AI’, Working Document for stakeholders’ consultation, Brussels, December 18, 2018, https://
ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/ draft-ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai.
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coercion, threats to mental autonomy and mental health, unjustified surveillance, 
deception and unfair manipulation”.
At intergovernmental level, the Council of Europe adopted last February a 
declaration on “the manipulative capabilities of algorithmic processes”.
«Contemporary machine learning tools have the growing ca-
pacity not only to predict choices but also to influence emotions 
and thoughts and alter an anticipated course of action, sometimes 
subliminally. The dangers for democratic societies that emanate 
from the possibility to employ such capacity to manipulate and 
control not only economic choices but also social and political be-
haviours, have only recently become apparent. In this context, par-
ticular attention should be paid to the significant power that tech-
nological advancement confers to those – be they public entities 
or private actors – who may use such algorithmic tools without 
adequate democratic oversight or control».5
Among the recommendations, the Council encourages Member States to 
initiate a discussion with a view to “providing guidance on where to draw the line 
between forms of permissible persuasion and unacceptable manipulation [...] 
and take appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure that effective legal 
guarantees are in place against such forms of illegitimate interference.”6
It is also worth mentioning the position paper published in 2018 by the Euro-
pean Consumer Organisation (BEUC) on ‘Automated Decision Making and Arti-
ficial Intelligence’7 which recognises the increased vulnerability of consumers to 
automated and AI decision-making and the increased risk of being manipulated 
by businesses into a specific purchasing choice.
From a methodological point of view, all these documents agree on the fact 
that, before introducing new legislation, policy-makers may need to review the 
adequacy of existing legislative bodies to explore whether they are out of step 
with ethical and legal challenges that AI is presenting.
5 Council of Europe, Declaration by the Committee of Ministers on the manipulative capabilities of algo-
rithmic processes, Decl (13/02/2019) 1, 13 February 2019 https://search.coe.int/cm/pages/result_details.
aspx?ObjectId=090000168092dd4b.
6 The recommendation specifies that unacceptable manipulation “may take the form of influence that is 
subliminal, exploits existing vulnerabilities or cognitive biases, and/or encroaches on the independence and 
authenticity of individual decision-making”.
7 BEUC, Automated Decision Making and Artificial Intelligence, BEUC Position Paper, 20/06/2018, 
https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2018-058_automated_decision_making_and_artificial_intelli-
gence.pdf.
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In this regard, protecting the freedom of individuals against unfair com-
mercial manipulation is certainly not new to the law. Historically, every nation-
al system of the Western legal tradition has developed, to a greater or lesser 
extent, its own legal framework to ensure fair relations between traders and 
consumers.8 In the European Union, since the last decades of the 20th century, 
this task has been taken up to a substantial part by the Community institutions 
with the objective to ensure a high level of consumer protection (Howells et al., 
2006; Keirsbilck, 2011). After a period of negative harmonisation carried out 
by the European Court of Justice, since the 1980s, the Community has issued 
several instruments to harmonise different activities related to advertising and 
marketing9: the Misleading Advertising Directive10 later extended to cover also 
comparative advertising11, the Unfair Contract Terms Directive12, the Data Pro-
tection Directive13, the Price Indication Directive14, the ECommerce Directive15. 
The culmination of European imprinting on the law of fair marketing trading law 
was achieved in 2005 with the adoption of the Unfair Commercial Practice Di-
rective,16 a maximum harmonisation directive providing a general framework for 
unfair business-to-consumer practices.
The regulatory options have varied over time (substantial versus informa-
tion-based intervention), especially in recent decades the EU has put at the cen-
tre of its agenda the need to empower consumers to protect their interests by 
making autonomous and informed choices (Weatherill, 2013). This ambition is 
8 Generally, national fair marketing law protects three sets of interests: (1) the non-economic (e.g., 
health and safety) and economic (i.e., to some extent misleading and deceptive practices) interests of 
consumers); (2) the interest of competitors for a fair competition (The interest of competitors is conceptually 
different from the interest of general competition law that seeks to prevent the abuse of market power; it is 
more connected to intellectual property law, especially trademarks law and passing off actions), and (3) the 
interest of the public at large to promote taste and decency and appropriate standard of conducts.
9 Consumer protection law includes a wide and diverse set of regulatory tools and policies that can be 
classified in distinct (and also largely autonomous) legal areas or subfields. Here, we refer to ‘fair marketing 
law’ as the part of consumer protection law that directly regulates fairness in advertising and marketing.
10 Directive 84/450/EC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning misleading advertising, OJ 1984 L250/17.
11 Directive 97/55/EC amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as to in-
clude comparative advertising, OJ 1997 L290/18.
12 Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993 L95/29.
13 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data OJ 1995 L281/31.
14 Directive 98/6/EC on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to con-
sumers, OJ 1998 L80/27.
15 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ 2000 L178/1.
16 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal 
market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and 
Regulation N. 2006/2004, OJ 2005 L149/22.
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deeply linked to the project of a competitive internal market. Competition can 
only be guaranteed if consumers are informed and autonomous in making pur-
chasing decisions because traders who act unfairly will no longer be able to win 
business away from competitors who play by the rules (Stuyck et al., 2006). In 
order to have a competitive single market, there must also be a level playing field 
with regard to national fair market laws, so that both traders and consumers can 
be more confident in trading and shopping across borders without having to 
face different regulations. In this context, it is useful to understand that compa-
nies using manipulative tactics not only invade the autonomy of consumers (thus 
causing a possible loss of welfare if consumers would have chosen otherwise) 
but also contributes to distorting the competitive dynamics of the market.
Therefore, questions arise on the role of existing EU fair marketing law in the 
development of AI that does not interfere with and distort consumers’ autono-
mous and informed decision-making on their purchase choices.
Since the early days of the Internet, EU policy-makers have always stressed 
the importance of applying the same consumer protection rules online and 
offline. This has generally led to a somewhat neutral (or ‘non-exceptionalist’) 
approach to EU fair marketing and general consumer protection law in rela-
tion to digital phenomena (Brownsword, 2016). For some years, however, there 
have been significant indications that this trend has reversed. Latest develop-
ments (the Geo-Blocking Regulation17, the Digital Content Directive18, the Sale 
of Goods Directive19, the so-called “Omnibus Consumer Directive”20) show an 
increased focus on digital, data-driven trends and the need to update new rules 
or provide special rules to regulate them (Twigg-Flesner, 2018).
In the context of this current debate, a serious discussion is needed to de-
termine whether existing EU fair trade legislation, in particular rules preventing 
distortion of consumers’ economic behaviour, can withstand the impact of new 
forms of AI-based manipulation or whether it should be amended to provide new 
solutions for consumers.
17 Regulation (EU) 2018/302 on addressing unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination 
based on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the internal market 
and amending Regulations (EC) No 2006/2004 and (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ 2018 
L60I/1.
18 Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and 
digital services, OJ 2019 L 136/1.
19 Directive (EU) 2019/771 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sale of goods, amending 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive 2009/22/EC, and repealing Directive 1999/44/EC, OJ 2019 
L136/28.
20 Directive (EU) 2019/2161 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29/EC and 2011/83/EU of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union con-
sumer protection rules, OJ L 328/7.
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6. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: virtues and vices
Recently, some contributions (Mik, 2016; Helberger, 2016; Sax et al., 2018) 
have designated the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive as a suitable regulato-
ry candidate to address the problems of ‘digital market manipulation’21.
As mentioned in the previous section, the Directive on unfair commercial 
practices is the highest achievement of EU fair marketing law. The Directive seeks 
to provide a European conception of fairness in business-consumer relation-
ships by introducing a general clause on unfair commercial practices (Howells 
et al., 2006, 2017). The UCPD was adopted fourteen years ago, but still today 
remains a very relevant and debated legal instrument, not only because of its 
many ambiguities, but also for its implications for business and consumers, and 
Member States’ legislation. The Directive has an impact on national legislation 
on fair marketing, intersects national contract law, not to mention the complex 
and multi-level enforcement system, which deeply involves each Member State.
Exactly the vagueness of the text makes the UCPD a very flexible tool that 
could also accommodate current AI-powered marketing practices. Article 5 
broadly defines unfair business-to-consumers practices as those that (a) contra-
ry to the requirement of professional diligence (b) are able to materially distort the 
economic behaviour with regard to the product of the average consumer whom 
it reaches or is addressed.
On the basis of this general clause, the Directive prohibits misleading prac-
tices and aggressive practices.22 More specifically, Article 8 defines as ‘aggres-
sive’ those practices that “by harassment, coercion, including the use of physical 
force, or undue influence, (it) significantly impair(s) or (is/) are likely to significantly 
impair the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct with regard to the 
product and thereby causes him or (is/) are likely to cause him to take a transac-
tional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”. Ultimately, the Directive 
also provides for an annex containing specific practices considered unfair in all 
circumstance.
21 These works build on the seminal paper by Calo (2014) who defines digital market manipulation as 
“the specific set of emerging technologies and techniques that will empower corporations to discover and 
exploit the limits of each consumer’s ability to pursue his or her own self-interest”.
22 A commercial practice is misleading if it contains false or untrue information or is likely to deceive the 
average consumer, even though the information may be correct, and cause them to take a transactional 
decision they would not have otherwise taken. Examples of such actions include false or deceptive informa-
tion regarding the existence or nature of the product; the main characteristics of the product (its availability, 
benefits, risks, composition, geographical origin, results to be expected from its use, etc.); the extent of the 
trader’s commitments (in codes of conduct by which the trader has agreed to be bound), etc. Cf. Article 6 
UCPD.
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From the debate around the UCPD and its aptitude to meet the challenges 
of digital manipulation, it appears that both the prohibition of aggressive prac-
tices and – alternatively and secondarily – the general clause present interesting 
starting points for further elaboration.
As far as aggressive practices are concerned, the concept of ‘undue in-
fluence’ seems to fit the discussion (Sax et al., 2018). This is described as the 
exploitation of a position of power to apply pressure and limit the consumers’ 
ability to make an informed decision (Article 2, lit. j). Considering the increased 
information asymmetry and the unprecedented power of digital business to 
shape the virtual and legal substance of commercial relationships, it could be 
argued that companies using data-driven AI techniques for marketing are in a 
position of power over consumers so that any exploitation of such position could 
lead to undue influence. As a further element, it is appreciated that the Directive 
does not require a causal link between the practice and the actual distortion of 
behaviour («is likely to significantly impair [...] are likely to cause»). This charac-
teristic is of great importance considering AI-powered manipulative schemes 
that rely on prediction (probability), rather than certainty (causality) (Mik, 2016). 
More generally, commentators notice that the Directive notes that the UCPD 
does not exclusively protect the interests of the individual consumer, but also 
“broader conceptual questions about the kind of information economy we would 
like to live in, and the values that should shape it”, (Helberger, 2016). This note 
is particularly relevant to the issue of AI-based manipulation, where it is difficult 
to completely separate the impact of manipulation on individual consumers from 
its repercussion from a broader societal perspective.
That said, it is also recognised that the same policy that has traditionally 
characterised the interpretation and application of the UCPD would represent 
– to the statu quo – an obstacle to provide consumers with meaningful protec-
tions. These observations are often associated with the poor implementation in 
consumer policy and law-making (including in the UCPD) of the findings coming 
from behavioural economics (Trzaskowski, 2018).23
The paradigm of the rational consumer.
The UCPD offers flexible protection depending on the addressee of the 
practice. As a general rule, the unfairness of a practice is assessed from the per-
spective of the ‘average consumer’. With some exceptions, this notion is steadi-
ly interpreted by the European Court of Justice as the “reasonably well-informed 
23 As noted by the Author, there is indeed a close connection between the uptake of behavioural re-
search, both in private and public spaces, technological innovation and AI advancement and the need for 
a ‘behavioural turn’ in the policy-making, interpretation and enforcement of the law, including consumer 
protection law.
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and reasonably observant and circumspect”. At the same time, however, it has 
been repeatedly observed that this traditional conception of consumer clashes 
with the basic findings of behavioural economics, according to which consum-
ers have bounded rationality and limited willpower, are guided by heuristics and 
their judgement is often biased (Incardona and Poncibo, 2007; Sibony, 2014). 
This is even truer in the AI landscape, where companies can easily estimate the 
tendency of each consumer to deviate from rational decision-making, detect 
and react to emotion.
A strict notion of vulnerability.
Article 5 of the UCPD provides for an alternative benchmark when the 
commercial practice has the potential to distort the behaviour of consumers 
considered vulnerable. In such cases, however, the Directive shows a narrow 
understanding of ‘vulnerability’. This is demonstrated by the fact that only certain 
specific categories of consumers who are intrinsically exposed to marketing and 
contracting are granted with higher protection (mentally or physically ill, minors, 
and credulous people). This conception has been criticised for being too severe, 
primarily because vulnerability can be ‘situational’ as there are many factors that 
are external to consumers themselves than can cause vulnerability (e.g., lack 
of knowledge of the language, lack of education to deal with highly-complex 
commercial sectors, or the use of technologies with which the consumer is not 
familiar). Secondly, the concept of vulnerability can also be ‘relational’ and may 
depend on some consumers’ increased susceptibility to specific techniques and 
marketing practices implemented by businesses (Waddington, 2013).
A limited elaboration of professional diligence.
According to the general clause of Article 5, a commercial practice is unfair 
only if it is contrary to the requirement of professional diligence. This is defined 
as the “the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be 
expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market 
practice and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity” 
(Article 2, lit. h). Since the early days of the adoption of the UCPD, the notion of 
professional diligence has had little elaboration, which has reduced its legal rele-
vance (Howells et al., 2006). This has led commentators to focus on the second 
tier of the general clause (‘the material distortion requirement’). Arguably, how-
ever, a serious discussion on new technology-mediated manipulation and its 
legitimacy should also reconsider the role of a European concept of professional 
diligence in the field of AI (Trzaskowski, 2018).
The incompatibility between the new marketing trends and the UCPD is 
even clearer if we consider two other developments that are – so to speak 
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– ‘AI-driven’ and that are incoherent not simply with the substantive policy of the 
UCPD, but also with the very architecture of the Directive.
Personalisation of harm.
As mentioned in Section 3, AI techniques allow today for the personalisation 
of any aspect of business-consumer interactions. While it is possible to custom-
ise websites and advertising to increase consumers’ engagement and welfare, 
companies can also adopt the persuasion strategy for each individual consumer 
that best fits their psychographic or emotional profile (Kaptein et al., 2015). It 
follows that what is harmful to one specific consumer can be harmful to another. 
In this context of immanent ‘personalised harm’, a particular consumer may not 
be vulnerable and be perfectly circumspect and well-informed, but in the face of 
such invasive and powerful business practices, he or she may become vulnera-
ble at any time during the day. This implies that the dichotomy between rational 
consumers and vulnerable consumers no longer reflects the reality of marketing, 
and that vulnerability does not necessarily pre-exist in the commercial relation-
ship, but often becomes a by-product of the interaction itself (Calo, 2014). That 
is why fair marketing law should intervene not only when a consumer is already 
vulnerable and firms are taking advantage, but also – and indeed even more so – 
when the company leverages what it knows about the consumer to purposefully 
make him or her vulnerable.
Opacity and oversight.
Together with the intrinsic opaque essence of manipulation (If manipulation 
circumvents our deliberative system, it may be the case that we do not realise 
we are being manipulated), the fact that attempts at manipulation are made 
through the use of AI generates additional layers of opacity, namely (1) the cor-
porate secrecy on the algorithms; (2) the technical illiteracy of consumers over AI 
processes; (3) the intrinsic lack of transparency of some ML algorithms (Burrell, 
2016). This multi-faceted opacity causes serious problems to the current gov-
ernance system of the UCPD. The latter was designed with legislators taking into 
account ‘offline’ commercial practices. The control over traditional marketing 
practices has always relied on more or less extensive degrees of publicity (think 
of advertising made through street billboards, press, radio and TV). Hence the 
prevalence in many Member States of a public system of oversight and enforce-
ment in case of manipulative business conducts. In the AI era, however, where 
manipulation is tailor-made for every single consumer, only the latter is able to 
recognise the unfairness of the practice. Yet, the single consumer may not even 
realise that he or she has been manipulated or when he or she realises, he or 
she may fail to undertake action because often the cost of acting is simply much 
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higher than the cost of ignoring the manipulative trick. For this reason, it might be 
that for every individual consumer the damage is small, but on the societal level, 
the most basic principles we agreed upon as a community are being openly 
disregarded (Jabłonowska et al., 2018). A kind of public monitoring is therefore 
needed, and to this end, fair marketing law will have to explore new avenues.
The UCPD sees ‘manipulation’ as the material distortion of the average con-
sumer’s economic behaviour. This design creates a strong link between the ma-
nipulative practice and the ideal consumer to whom it is addressed. The effect is 
that the analysis on the unlawfulness of the practice is often reduced to simply 
establishing who the average consumer is. The author believes that this architec-
ture is fundamentally inconsistent with the reality of marketing practices. As said 
in Section 4, AI is conceptually transforming manipulation into the ability of com-
panies to manage and shape automatic processes to guide customers towards 
predetermined outcomes. In this scenario, where decisions are made behind the 
scenes and embedded in automated decision-making processes, the likelihood 
of a manipulative outcome will depend less on whether the average consumer is 
rational or vulnerable or otherwise. In personalised commercial practices, there is 
nothing as the ‘average consumer’: depending on the profile, for each individual 
consumer there might exist a specific strategy of persuasion, thus a potential “per-
sonalised harm”. It will be difficult to abstract away a standardised notion of the 
consumer from each specific situation. Second, if manipulation becomes a struc-
tural feature of AI-mediated business-to-consumer interactions, the ability of con-
sumers to remove themselves from the business’s influence will be reduced and 
impractical, unless they decide not to interact with the business in the first place.
It seems that against this development the only way to ensure fair com-
mercial relations is to ‘open the box’ and find original solutions that can better 
balance the opposite interests of market players.
An attempt in this direction was recently made by the EU Directive 
2019/2161, issued with the goal of a “better enforcement and modernisation of 
EU consumer protection rules”, the so-called “Omnibus Directive”. The Directive 
amends four EU consumer law directives: the Unfair Contract Terms Directive, 
the Price Indication Directive, the Contract Rights Directive and the Unfair Com-
mercial Practice Directive. As expressed in the title, the legislative act has been 
driven by the need to improve awareness among consumers, traders and legal 
practitioners about consumer rights and to improve enforcement of consumer 
rights and consumer redress, as well as update or introduce new rules tailored 
to online market transactions. 
In this latter respect, the reform brings some important novelties that address 
two developments directly related to the issue of consumer manipulation through 
means of technological influence. First, the operator of an online marketplace 
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must provide consumers with clear information regarding the criteria used to 
rank offers and, more specifically, whether the higher ranking of a certain product 
is the consequence of a direct or indirect payment.24 Ranking refers to the prom-
inence of offers of traders and the relevance given to search results as present-
ed, organised and communicated to consumers (resulting, for example, from 
algorithmic sequencing, visual highlights and rating or review mechanisms). By 
its nature, ranking is considered one of the most effective nudges of consumer 
choice (Mik, 2016): it does not hide all relevant options, but the positioning of a 
search result heavily conditions the likelihood of a choice being made. Secondly, 
consumers must be informed when a price presented to them online is based 
on algorithms taking into account their personal behaviour.25 Price personali-
sation, too, has elements that make it problematic for the consumer to take 
free decisions. As noted by Ezrachi and Stucke, through price personalisation 
techniques, firms can nudge consumers closer to their reservation price by the 
way they present options online (Ezrachi and Stucke, 2016). For example, the 
practice of price steering (e.g., showing different products to customers in dif-
ferent demographic groups) can lead certain consumers to make sub-optimal 
decisions and more expensive purchase choices (Hannak et al., 2014).
These legislative developments represent an attempt to prevent the use of 
technology in online transactions from taking place at the expense of consum-
ers. Nonetheless, the author believes that they can only provide partial protec-
tion to consumers. Firstly, they are largely based on information requirements. 
There is no ban on using algorithmic systems to influence consumers in ranking 
or in personalising prices, as long as this is made clear to the user. Moreover, 
ranking and personalisation are only two of the nudges currently deployed by 
online platforms operators. Emotional tricks, framing effect, image motivation, 
social norms are other very effective triggers that influence choice relevantly and 
might need to be taken into account in a more comprehensive legislative reform 
(Mirsch et al., 2017). Finally, the recent legislative developments do not take a 
serious stance on the problems for consumers’ decision-making connected to 
the deployment of AI tools in marketing – and not simply of automated deci-
sion-making systems. The latter are capable – and will be even more so in the 
future – of outperforming human beings in intellective and reactive capacity to 
understand consumers, their desire, needs, fears and emotions. This will likely 
result in the risk of widespread manipulative outcomes and the systematic failure 
of consumers’ sovereignty in purchase decisions, as long as serious reform-ori-
ented debate is not undertaken. 
24 Article 3(4)(b) and Article 3(7)(a) of the Omnibus Directive.
25 Article 4(4)(a)(ii) of the Omnibus Directive. See also Recital 45.
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7. New regulation: The example of the US Detour Act
In addition to the aforementioned EU legislative development, it seems ap-
propriate for our analysis to consider the recent US legislative proposal of the 
DETOUR Act which, under the umbrella of US fair market law, explores new 
ways to protect consumers against manipulative practices of digital business.
The Federal Trade Commission Act is the most essential US fair trade and 
consumer protection law. It establishes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the 
authority responsible for enforcing its provisions and promoting consumer pro-
tection. The FTC has considerable powers to prosecute any “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce” (Section 5 FTC Act).
Through this broad mandate, the FTC has become the key player in the 
suppression of unfair and manipulative marketing practices over the last cen-
tury. In particular, the vague definition of ‘unfair or deceptive act’ has enabled 
the Commission to play a critical role in limiting unforeseen new business prac-
tices made possible by technological advancements (Hoofnagle, 2016). Over 
the years, however, the Commission’s power has been progressively reduced 
through policy rules, additional regulation, and case law. Most recently, the US 
Congress has limited the authority of the FTC by specifying that it can consider 
only established public policies as evidence of consumer harm. This change sig-
nificantly reduced the ability of the Commission to develop autonomously new 
enforcement policies to cope with digital transformations.26
That is why it is material that, on 7th April 2019, two US Senators issued a 
draft bill (called DETOUR Act, as an acronym for ‘Deception Experience To On-
line User Reduction Act’) whose purpose is to “prohibit the usage of exploitative 
and deceptive practices by large online operators and to promote consumer 
welfare in the use of behavioural research by such providers.”27
The whole bill revolves around Section 3, which is relevant for three reasons.
A) First, it proclaims certain practices that are carried out by operators of 
large online platforms28 and related to the manipulation of user interface, as “un-
fair and deceptive acts and practices”. In this, the proposal immediately sug-
gests that the new law should be regarded as a lex specialis of the FTC Act. 
26 Section 45, lit. n, FTC Act.
27 S. 1084/2017, info at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1084/ all-info, text at 
https://it.scribd.com/document/405606873/Detour-Act-Final.
28 These are defined as any person that a) provides an online service (“a website or a service, other than 
an internet access service, that is made available to the public over the internet, including a social network, 
a search engine, or email service”); b) has more than one million of authenticated users in any 30-day peri-
od; and c) is subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC.
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Accordingly, under Section 3(d), violations of the provisions will be treated as 
violations of the rules defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice under Sec-
tion 18(a)(1)(B) FTC Act. The FTC will thus be formally invested by the Congress 
with powers to police new deceptive practices. More specifically, the conducts 
considered unfair and thus prohibited are: 
1.  “to design, modify, or manipulate a user interface with the purpose or 
substantial effect of obscuring, subverting, or impairing user autonomy, 
decision-making, or choice to obtain user data”;
2.  “to subdivide or segment consumers of online services into groups for the 
purposes of behavioural or psychological experiments or studies, except 
with the informed consent of each user involved”;
3.  “to design, modify, or manipulate a user interface on a website or online 
service, or portion thereof, that is directed to an individual under the age 
of 13, with the purpose or substantial effect of cultivating compulsive us-
age, inclusive of video auto-play functions initiated without the consent of 
a user”.
B) Secondly, regardless of the specific practice, if the online platform en-
gages in any form of behavioural or psychological research based on the ac-
tivity of its user, it shall routinely, but no less than once each 90 days, disclose 
(1) to its users, “any experiments or studies that user was subjected to or 
enrolled in with the purpose of promoting engagement or product conversion”; 
(2) to the public, “any experiments or studies with the purposes of promoting 
engagement or product conversion being currently undertaken, or concluded 
since the prior disclosure”. In this regard, the platforms shall also establish an 
internal Independent Review Board (IRB) that has to review and approve any 
behavioural or psychological experiments or research conducted by the online 
platform operator.
C) Finally, the draft establishes the option for an association of online plat-
forms to register as Professional Standard Bodies (PSB). These will be qualified 
to develop guidelines for the development and design of technology products 
consistent with the provisions of the Act. The PSB will also be competent to de-
fine conducts that “do not have the purpose or substantial effect of subverting or 
impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or choice, or cultivating compulsive 
usage for children” against which the FTC cannot bring an enforcement action. 
These are, for example, a) de minimis user interface changes derived from test-
ing consumer preferences including styles, layouts, text, except when they are 
aimed at obtaining user consent or user data; b) algorithms out of the control 
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of the platform; c) establishing default settings that provide enhanced users’ 
autonomy and decision-making.
We will not go much into details of the proposal because, although it is 
promising, it remains a proposal. Given the clear impact of the new provisions 
on the commercial activity of platforms, we will probably have to wait a long time 
before the proposal becomes, if ever, a law. Nevertheless, without advancing 
any conclusive judgements, I would like to draw attention to two main points 
which, in my view, suggest where fair marketing law is heading.
Behavioural and psychological experiments and research with the purpose 
of promoting engagement or product conversion.
As we said, Section 3 places a general prohibition on the practice of subdi-
viding or segmenting consumers into groups for behavioural and psychological 
experiments and research, unless valid consent is obtained from each user in-
volved. For its validity, consent must be given before the user is included in any 
experiments or study and must be informed. According to Section 2, it should 
allow for an informed decision on the voluntary participation in the experiment 
or study and ensure an understanding of any benefits, risks or consequences of 
participation. In addition, regardless of whether it subdivides or segments con-
sumers into groups, when the platform performs behavioural and psychological 
experiments and research, it must comply with the disclosure requirements set 
out in Section 3(b)(1). The latter requires the communication to the user and the 
public of any experiments or studies of which the user has been a part of “with 
the purpose of promoting engagement or product conversion”.
Both provisions focus on the notion of ‘behavioural and psychological exper-
iments and research’. This is described as any “study, including through human 
experimentation, of overt or observable actions and mental phenomena inferred 
from behaviour, including interactions between and among individuals and the 
activities of social groups”. The definition is very broad and seems to encompass 
any possible analysis of user data. While ‘overt and observable action’ refers 
to simple behavioural data (e.g., purchase records, transactional data, search 
data, app usage data, etc.), ‘mental phenomena inferred from behaviour’ seem 
to be exactly the use of analytics techniques to predict psychological traits or 
emotional state (both are mental phenomena). Data on the private and public 
interaction between individuals and within a group are also covered (e.g., likes, 
post, images on social media, etc.). In other words, any kind of data-analysis ac-
tivity is likely to be a ‘behavioural and psychological experiment and research’.29
29 The prohibition in Section(3)(a) applies only when the platform carries out behavioural and psycholog-
ical experiment and research upon having subdivided or segmented consumers into groups. However, it is 
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As an additional element, the definition also includes experiments, especial-
ly ‘human experiments’. Although the term is not clear and full of ambiguities, 
one might expect that the notion of ‘experiments’ here refers to the activity of 
repeatedly testing in a digital environment the actual behaviour of consumers 
(hence the ‘human’ component) under different conditions.30 If ‘experiments’ is 
so understood, the proposal will certainly put under scrutiny many of the com-
mon techniques that are used in web design, such as A/B testing. At the same 
time, it is not clear whether the concept will also include new, more sophisticated 
methods of experimentation driven by AI. Reinforcement learning, in particular, is 
described as “type of sequential experimentation” as it implies a process of tri-
al-and-error coupled with feedback provided by the environment that signals the 
utility of the result (Varian, 2018). If yes, the platform that uses RL-based mar-
keting tools supposedly should provide meaningful information on how the algo-
rithms works and how it affects consumers’ decision-making, so as to ensure 
that users understand any possible risks, including potential distorting outcomes 
(e.g., a mapping between consumer action and the algorithm’s goal). However, 
this aspect needs further investigation.
Operators of the platform should disclose behavioural and psychological 
experiments and research that are aimed at promoting engagement and prod-
uct conversion. It is easy to understand why these two terms appear. Out of 
rhetoric, ‘engagement and product conversion’ are rather ambivalent concepts: 
they indicate the ‘end’ of a business strategy, but do not consider the ‘means’ 
of it. Manipulative tactics using ‘morphing’ may well promote the user website 
engagements, as much as exploitative advertising techniques could lead to op-
timisation of conversion. However, according to what we said in the previous 
sections, they would be hardly considered acceptable from an ethical point of 
view. It is therefore commendable that the proposal establishes not only safe-
guards before the study or the experiment (users’ consent), but also afterwards 
(the obligation to periodically disclose the conducted experiments and study). 
The latter, in particular, aims to create an open and transparent accountability 
system that allows both competitors (who may have an interest in consumers 
not being manipulated) and law enforcement authorities to monitor the opera-
tions of platforms on users’ data.
rare that the research and experiments that the bill is supposed to address do not previously involve some 
form of subdivision or segmentation of consumers into groups. Large online platforms indeed are generally 
based on big data and analysing such a large amount of data would be too expensive if some profiling or 
clustering techniques were used.
30 OFCOM, Using experiments in consumer research, 2010, accessible at <https://www.ofcom.org.
uk/__data/ assets/pdf_file/0023/31865/experiments.pdf>.
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Obscuring, subverting, or impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or 
choice.
If the bill becomes law, large online platforms will no longer be able to design, 
modify, or manipulate their website with the purpose or the substantial effect of 
‘obscuring, subverting, or impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or choice 
to obtain consent or user data’. This prohibition refers to the infamous phenom-
enon of ‘dark patterns’, which describes the practice of online platforms’ oper-
ators of implementing misleading website design to extort consumers consent, 
either for the acceptance of terms and conditions or for the processing of their 
personal data (Gray et al., 2018).
In addition to the general ban, the bill also demonstrates a constructive ap-
proach for protecting users’ autonomy vis-à-vis new AI-mediated forms of ma-
nipulation. Section 3(c)(3) states that associations of online platforms’ operators 
(i.e., Professional Standards Body) are responsible for establishing behaviours 
that do not have the purpose or the substantial effect of subverting or impair-
ing user autonomy, decision-making, or choice, among which ‘default settings’ 
that ‘enhance their autonomy and decision-making ability’. In the wake of the 
‘privacy by default’ movement (i.e., the adoption of highest standard of privacy 
protection as the default rule), the bill seems to support the idea of a share, 
sectorial implementation of an autonomy-enhancing environment (Brownsword, 
2011), which empowers consumers to make autonomous and informed choices 
and avoids undue forms of influence (e.g., ad-blocking tools, personalised filters, 
customised settings, friendly UX design standards, etc.).31
It has been noted that many of the provisions of the proposal are poor-
ly defined, which, if not changed, will leave too much discretion to the FTC.32 
Surely, however, there will be time and space for changes and improvements in 
the delineation of some concepts. Yet, for the time being, the draft proposal of 
the Detour Act already foresees interesting pathways that the EU fair marketing 
law could follow. First, it shows that the institutional secrecy on algorithms and 
machine-driven experimentation can no longer be sustained if the system aims 
to ensure fair marketing relationships and prevent manipulating outcomes. Fair 
marketing law will have to consider new forms of accountability, either through 
private disclosure requirements or through some form of public control. Second-
ly, fair marketing law should further explore the opportunity of a co-regulatory 
31 It would also be interesting to start a discussion on ‘consumer protection by design’, i.e., AI-powered 
marketing tools that integrate a priori consumers’ autonomy protection standards that prevent a manipu-
lating outcome.
32 Will Rinehart, DETOUR Act Gives Sweeping Powers to FTC, American Action Forum (April 15, 2019), 
accessible at <https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/ detour-act-gives-sweeping-powers-to-
ftc/.>.
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approach, where the legislator establishes general prohibitions and/or mandates 
for disclosures and the organisations of platforms’ operators – under the super-
vision of an independent and external authority – provide for technical stand-
ards. Lawyers, especially consumer lawyers, should be involved in the future 
discussion.
8. Conclusion
Artificial Intelligence is affecting business activities and strategies and will do 
so more and more in the years to come. This transformation is having enormous 
repercussions on the economic and legal substance of the relationship between 
businesses and consumers. In particular, the fact that relationships between 
businesses and consumers are increasingly mediated by the presence of intelli-
gent algorithms that learn how to improve in order to carry out tasks on the ba-
sis of continuous consumers’ feedback, will not only profoundly strengthen the 
ability of companies to better allocate their products, but will also diminish the 
ability of consumers to make their own decisions and pursue their self-interest.
The use of AI by companies in marketing rekindles the debate about com-
mercial manipulation and the opportunity for legal intervention. Since the dawn 
of business, whenever a new technology is used in marketing, a general wave 
of ‘persuasion panic’ is often contrasted with sceptics who claim that new 
techniques are not as effective as one would think or are indistinguishable from 
already established practice. Against AI-powered marketing, this argument of 
‘nothing new under the sun’ seems very weak. Not simply because of a matter 
of scale (AI increases the granularity and the ‘sensitivity’ of information about 
consumers to an unprecedented degree, thus increasing the effectiveness of 
marketing and advertising), but also because AI is leading marketing to a change 
in nature. The latter is turning into the activity of companies to pre-design inter-
actions with consumers in order to gain an economic advantage by means of 
skillful coding. This is not to say that every company that uses AI is obnoxious 
and manipulates consumers, but that manipulation of consumers behaviour 
might result as a by-product of business-consumer interactions.
In this context, it is not inappropriate to question the role of fair marketing 
law. Directly or indirectly, the latter has always been concerned to protect con-
sumers’ decision-making from any unfair intrusions by commercial actors. If this 
mission is to be continued in the future, consideration must be given to wheth-
er the existing regulation is capable of protecting from AI applications that are 
spreading in the market. In the European Union, the Unfair Commercial Practice 
Directive provides a remarkably open and technology-neutral framework which, 
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at first sight, seems to offer enough room for evolving and novel interpretations. 
At the same time, however, the legal structure and the normative bedrock of 
the Directive end up revealing a socioeconomic reality, that of purely ‘analogic’ 
and standardised consumption, which is largely already behind us. The recent 
EU legislative attempt to modernise fair marketing law and to regulate the use 
of automated decision-making to influence consumers’ choices reflects only a 
partial understanding of the current and future technological developments in 
the market reality. We are not simply living in the era of online data-driven con-
sumption, but entering the age of “AI-mediated consumption”. Here, businesses 
operations are augmented by AI technologies which offer new opportunities for 
customising advertising, offerings, and contracts, but at the same time pose 
serious and unprecedented threats to consumers (Zuboff, 2019). 
Fair marketing legislation may need to explore new avenues. Looking espe-
cially at some regulatory developments that are taking place overseas, we briefly 
reviewed two original solutions. The first responds to the need of finding a new 
balance between the economic freedom of businesses and the autonomy and 
cognitive freedom of consumers, and allow a diffuse control over algorithmic pro-
cesses that potentially affect consumer decision-making. The second is aimed 
at providing, within the framework of general legislation and with ‘multi-stake-
holder’ approach, (consumer protection by) design standards to create technol-
ogy-mediated business interactions that preserve the autonomy of consumers.
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